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1. Introduction 
 
On December 11, 2011, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Court) ruled on Case C-
366/10, Air Transport Association of America, American Airlines Inc., Continental Airlines 
Inc., United Airlines Inc. v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change.1 The Court 
was asked to give preliminary ruling on the validity of Directive 2008/101 on the aviation 
activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the 
Community.2 The decision is important in that it highlights the nature and scope of the 
European Union’s obligation to observe the rules of international law. Moreover, the 
judgment is a fundamental contribution to clarify whether and to what extent individuals are 
entitled to rely in court on principles of customary international law in order to defeat 
(challenge) an act of the Union.3 
The present paper has not only the aim to analyse and asses the judgment in hand, but it also 
seeks to turn attention and to contribute to the clarification of a few concepts which are used 
in the context of this case analysis.4 
 
2. Factual background 
 
These questions were originally raised in litigation between the Air Transport Association of 
America (ATAA) and three airlines (whose headquarters are in the USA) on the one hand and 
the national authority being primarily responsible for the implementation of Directive 
2008/101 in the United Kingdom on the other. The Air Transport Association of America 
(ATAA), a non-profit-making entity, is the principal trade and service association of the 
United States scheduled airline industry. The airlines American Airlines Inc., Continental 
Airlines Inc. and United Airlines Inc. operate worldwide, also serving destinations within the 
European Union. 
The claimants brought judicial review proceedings asking the referring court (the High Court 
of Justice of England and Wales) to annul the measures of the United Kingdom Minister for 
Energy and Climate Change. They assert, in essence, that Directive 2008/101 – which the 
2009 Regulations serve to transpose – is not compatible with certain principles of 
international customary law and international agreements and is therefore invalid. 
 
 
3. Legal context 
 
3. 1. European Law 
 
The European Union is committed to transforming Europe into a highly energy-efficient and 
low greenhouse gas-emitting economy. The European Council made a firm independent 
commitment for the EU to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to at least 20 % below 1990 
levels by 2020.5 In line with this commitment the EU (together with its Member States) 
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became the party of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), which has the ultimate objective to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system.6 The EU also approved the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC.7  
 
The scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading applicable within the European 
Union (EU emissions trading scheme) serves to limit and reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
using market-based instruments.8 This scheme was introduced by Directive 2003/87/EC.9 
This Directive aims to contribute to fulfilling the commitments of the European Community 
and its Member States under the Kyoto Protocol more effectively, through an efficient 
European market in greenhouse gas emission allowances, with the least possible diminution 
of economic development and employment.10 
The Kyoto Protocol particularly requires developed countries to pursue the limitation or 
reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from 
aviation, working through the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). 
Under Directive 2003/87, greenhouse gas emissions resulting from aviation activities were 
originally not covered by the EU emissions trading scheme. In 2008, however, the EU 
legislature resolved to include aviation activities in the scheme as from 1 January 2012. 
Directive 2003/87 was amended and supplemented by Directive 2008/101 for that purpose.11 
On the basis of the emmission trading scheme introduced by it, each aircraft operator are 
allowed to emit pollutant only on the amount which is determined by emmission allowances 
allocated to them. All airlines – including those from third countries – will have to acquire 
and surrender emission allowances for their flights for a period of one year from and to 
European aerodromes. Penalties for infringement of emmission limits can extend to an 
operating ban.12 The Directive applies to „all flights which arrive at or depart from an 
aerodrome situated in the territory of a Member State to which the Treaty applies shall be 
included.13 
 
3. 2. International Law 
 
Reference is made in the request for a preliminary ruling to certain international agreements, 
especially the Chicago Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the ‘Open Skies Agreement’ 
between the European Union and the United States of America. 
 
While the Community is not a Contracting Party to the 1944 Chicago Convention on 
International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention), all 27 Member States are Contracting 
Parties to it.1415 Article 1 of the Chicago Convention provides that ‘The contracting States 
recognise that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its 
territory.’ 
 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted in New York on 9 
May 1992 (‘the Framework Convention’), has the ultimate objective of achieving stabilisation 
of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. On 11 December 1997 the parties to the 
Framework Convention adopted, pursuant thereto, the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (‘the Kyoto Protocol’), which entered into force 
on 16 February 2005. The European Union and the Member States are parties to both those 
instruments.16 
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On 25 and 30 April 2007, the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, 
and the United States of America, of the other part, concluded an air transport agreement 
designed in particular to facilitate the expansion of international air transport opportunities by 
opening access to markets and maximising benefits for consumers, airlines, labour, and 
communities on both sides of the Atlantic.17 
 
Article 7 of the Open Skies Agreement (headed ‘Application of laws’) states in paragraph 1:  
‘The laws and regulations of a Party relating to the admission to or departure from its territory 
of aircraft engaged in international air navigation, or to the operation and navigation of such 
aircraft while within its territory, shall be applied to the aircraft utilised by the airlines of the 
other Party, and shall be complied with by such aircraft upon entering or departing from or 
while within the territory of the first Party.’18 
The provosions of Article 11(1) and Article 11(2) c.) state that fuel, lubricants and 
consumable technical supplies introduced into or supplied in the territory of a Party for use in 
an aircraft of an airline of the other Party engaged in international air transportation shall be 
exempt from taxes, levies, duties, fees and charges. 
Finally, Article 15(3) provides that „When environmental measures [of the parties at the 
regional, national, or local level] are established, the aviation environmental standards 
adopted by the [ICAO] in annexes to the [Chicago] Convention shall be followed…” 
 
 
4. The Opinion of the Advocat General 
 
The European Union is bound by customary international law as well as (in the light of the 
above) by the international agreements applicable to it.19 (AG Kokott drew an analogy…) AG 
Kokott argued that criteria for determination of the invocability of international customary 
law should not differ from those applicable on an examination of whether and to what extent 
the validity of EU acts can be gauged against international agreements.20 It would make no 
sense if, when individuals are relying on one and the same principle of international law, 
different conditions were to apply according to whether it was being relied upon as a principle 
of customary international law or as a principle under an international agreement.21 It follows 
from the second sentence of Article 3(5) TEU (the Union‘shall contribute to […] strict 
observance and the development of international law’ as a whole) on the one hand and from 
the fact that many principles of customary international law have now been codified in 
international agreements on the other.22 
Based on the reasoning above, AG Kokott concluded that principles of customary 
international law should be recognised as a benchmark against which the validity of EU acts 
can be reviewed only when the two (above mentioned) conditions are satisfied: “1.) First, 
there must exist a principle of customary international law that is binding on the European 
Union. 2.) Secondly, the nature and broad logic of that particular principle of customary 
international law must not preclude such a review of validity; the principle in question must 
also appear, as regards its content, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise.”23 
 
5. The judgment 
 
5. 1. Invocability of provisions of international agreements 
 
The claimants are challenging Directive 2008/101 on three grounds: First, they contend that 
the European Union is exceeding its powers under international law by not confining its 
emissions trading scheme to wholly intra-European flights and by including within it those 
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sections of international flights that take place over the high seas or over the territory of third 
countries. (26) Secondly, they maintain that an emissions trading scheme for international 
aviation activities should be negotiated and adopted under the auspices of the ICAO; it should 
not be introduced unilaterally. (27) Thirdly, it was argued that the emissions trading scheme 
amounts to a tax or charge prohibited by international agreements.24 
The starting point for the Court’s judgment is the restatement of what have become according 
to settled case-law the standard requirements for the invocability of international agreement’s 
provisions as a benchmark against which the validity of acts of EU institutions can be 
reviewed: 
 
 52 First, the European Union must be bound by those rules.25  
 
 53 Second, the Court can examine the validity of an act of European Union law in the 
light of an international treaty only where the nature and the broad logic of the latter do not 
preclude this.26 
 
 54 Finally, where the nature and the broad logic of the treaty in question permit the 
validity of the act of European Union law to be reviewed in the light of the provisions of that 
treaty, it is also necessary that the provisions of that treaty which are relied upon for the 
purpose of examining the validity of the act of European Union law appear, as regards their 
content, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise.27 
 
 55 Such a condition if fulfilled where the provision relied upon contains a clear and 
precise obligation which is not subject, in its implementation or effects, to the adoption of any 
subsequent measure.28 
 
As far as the Chicago Convention is concerned, the European Union (as it has been 
established above) is not a party to the Chicago Convention while, on the other hand, all of its 
Member States are contracting parties.29 The Court pointed out, with reference on the settled 
case-law,30 that, although the first paragraph of Article 351 TFEU implies a duty on the part 
of the institutions of the European Union not to impede the performance of the obligations of 
Member States which stem from an agreement prior to 1 January 1958, such as the Chicago 
Convention, that duty of the institutions is designed to permit the Member States concerned to 
perform their obligations under a prior agreement and does not bind the European Union as 
regards the third States party to that agreement. Consequently, in the main proceedings, it is 
only if and in so far as, pursuant to the EU and FEU Treaties, the European Union has 
assumed the powers previously exercised by its Member States in the field, to which that 
international convention applies that the convention’s provisions would have the effect of 
binding the European Union (see, to this effect, International Fruit Company and Others, 
paragraph 18; Case C-379/92 Peralta [1994] ECR I-3453, paragraph 16; and Case C-301/08 
Bogiatzi [2009] ECR I-10185, paragraph 25). Indeed, in order for the European Union to be 
capable of being bound, it must have assumed, and thus had transferred to it, all the powers 
previously exercised by the Member States that fall within the convention in question (see, to 
this effect, Intertanko and Others, paragraph 49, and Bogiatzi, paragraph 33). Therefore, the 
fact that one or more acts of European Union law may have the object or effect of 
incorporating into European Union law certain provisions that are set out in an international 
agreement which the European Union has not itself approved is not sufficient for it to be 
incumbent upon the Court to review the legality of the act or acts of European Union law in 
the light of that agreement (see, to this effect, Intertanko and Others, paragraph 50).31 
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On the basis of examination of the EUs legislative activity in the international air transport,32 
the Court concluded that the powers previously exercised by the Member States in the field of 
application of the Chicago Convention have not to date been assumed in their entirety by the 
European Union. Therefore, the latter is not bound by the convention.33 
 
In case of Kyoto Protocol the first requirement is met, since it was approved on behalf of the 
Union. Consequently, in sense of the settled case-law, its provisions form an integral part of 
the Union’s legal order, thus, the Union must be bound by the Protocol. At the same time, the 
Court established that the protocol allows the contracting parties certain degree of flexibility 
in the implementation of their commitments. (therefore, the nature and the broad logic of the 
Protocol precludes the examination of the validity of an EU act in the light of its rules). 
Moreover, its relevant provisions cannot in any event be considered to be unconditional and 
sufficiently precise so as to confer on individuals the right to rely on it in legal proceedings in 
order to contest the validity of Directive 2008/101.34 
 
The Open Skies Agreement was also approved on behalf of the Union. As far as the 
invocability is concerned, the Court concluded that “Since the Open Skies Agreement 
establishes certain rules designed to apply directly and immediately to airlines and thereby to 
confer upon them rights and freedoms which are capable of being relied upon against the 
parties to that agreement, and the nature and the broad logic of the agreement do not so 
preclude, the conclusion can be drawn that the Court may assess the validity of an act of 
European Union law, such as Directive 2008/101, in the light of the provisions of the 
agreement.”35 Thus, as a following step, the Court went on to invstigate (examine), “whether 
the provisions of the Open Skies Agreement […] as regards their content, to be unconditional 
and sufficiently precise, so as to enable the Court to examine the validity of Directive 
2008/101 in the light of those particular provisions.”36 
The Court established that all the provisions of the Open Skies Agreements referred by the 
claimants contain an unconditional and sufficiently precise obligation that may be relied upon 
for the purpose of assessing the validity of Directive 2008/101 in the light of that provision.37 
 
5. 2. Invocability of rules of customary international law 
 
As possible grounds for challenge the validity of Directive 2008/101, the referring court 
mentions the principle that each State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over its 
airspace, the principle that no State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to 
its sovereignty and the principle of freedom to fly over the high seas. 
 
As a starting point of the reasoning, the Court cited its earlier case-law, establishing that 
customary international law is an integral part of the Community legal order.38 
As far as the criteria for recognition of invocability of customary international law (above) is 
concerned, the Court essentially followed the AG’s line of reasoning. However, it should be 
pointed out that the Court interpreted these criteria as a competence-question, stating that „the 
principles of customary international law […] may be relied upon by an individual for the 
purpose of the Court’s examination of the validity of an act of the European Union in so far 
as, first, those principles are capable of calling into question the competence of the European 
Union to adopt that act […] and, second, the act in question is liable to affect rights which the 
individual derives from European Union law or to create obligations under European Union 
law in this regard.”39 In line with this reasoning, the Court made a substantial distinction 
between binding effect of international customary law on the one hand and those of 
international agreements on the other: “since a principle of customary international law does 
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not have the same degree of precision as a provision of an international agreement, judicial 
review must necessarily be limited to the question whether, in adopting the act in question, the 
institutions of the European Union made manifest errors of assessment concerning the 
conditions for applying those principles”.40 That means that the lack of competence of the 
Union can be established (only) in so far as the Union, in the light of principles of 
international customary law, made a manifest error of assessment attributable to the 
European Union regarding its competence to adopt that directive.41  
Based on the conditions summarised above, the Court went on to investigate, if the validity of 
the directive can be challenged on the basis of infringement of principles referred to by the 
applicants (claimants) of the main proceeding. 
 
5. 3. The result 
 
Having regard to all the foregoing considerations, the Court established that the only 
principles and provisions of international law, from among those mentioned by the referring 
court, that can be relied upon for the purpose of assessing the validity of Directive 2008/101, 
are: first, the principles of customary international law, within the limits of review as to a 
manifest error of assessment attributable to the European Union regarding its competence to 
adopt that directive; second, the provisions of the Open Skies Agreement investigated 
above.42 
The Court then went on to summarize the essence of the questions of the referring court as the 
following: whether Directive 2008/101 is valid in the light of the possible grounds for review 
identified above if and in so far as that directive is intended to apply the allowance trading 
scheme to those parts of flights which take place outside the airspace of the Member States, 
including to flights by aircraft registered in third States.43 Accordingly, the Court built up a 
two-stage method of investigation: 1. It should first be determined whether and to what extent 
Directive 2008/101 applies to those parts of international flights that are performed outside 
the airspace of the Member States by such airlines. 2. Second, the directive’s validity should 
be examined in that context.44 
At the first stage, the Court established that the directive is not intended to apply as such to 
international flights flying over the territory of the Member States of the European Union or 
of third States when such flights do not arrive at or depart from an aerodrome situated in the 
territory of a Member State.45 
As far as the reference on customary international law is concerned, the Court concludes, in 
essence, that it follows from the above interpretation of the extent to which Directive 
2008/101 applies, that the directive does not infringe the principles of customary international 
law in question, since the EU legislation may be applied to an aircraft operator when its 
aircraft is in the territory of one of the Member States. In such a case, that aircraft is subject to 
the unlimited jurisdiction of that Member State and the European Union.46 
The Court argued that it is only if the operator of such an aircraft has chosen to operate a 
commercial air route arriving at or departing from an aerodrome situated in the territory of a 
Member State that the operator, because its aircraft is in the territory of that Member State, 
will be subject to the allowance trading scheme. As European Union policy on the 
environment seeks to ensure a high level of protection in accordance with Article 191(2) 
TFEU, the European Union legislature may in principle choose to permit a commercial 
activity to be carried out in the territory of the European Union only on condition that 
operators comply with the criteria that have been established by the European Union and are 
designed to fulfill the environmental protection objectives which it has set for itself, in 
particular where those objectives follow on from an international agreement to which the 
European Union is a signatory, such as the Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol. 
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Furthermore, the fact that, in the context of applying European Union environmental 
legislation, certain matters contributing to the pollution of the air, sea or land territory of the 
Member States originate in an event which occurs partly outside that territory is not such as to 
call into question, in the light of the principles of customary international law, the full 
applicability of European Union law in that territory. 
 
The Court then came to the final conclusion that the European Union had competence, in the 
light of the principles of customary international law capable of being relied upon in the 
context of the main proceedings, to adopt Directive 2008/101, in so far as the latter extends 
the allowance trading scheme to all flights which arrive at or depart from an aerodrome 
situated in the territory of a Member State.47 
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Comment 
 
In the present judgment, the Court sheds further light on position of international law in the 
Community legal order. The ruling gives opportunity to examine the following questions in 
particular: 1.) under which conditions can rules of customary international law be regarded as 
ground for invalidity of secondary EU Law; 2.) to which extent are able private individuals to 
rely on a rule of customary international law before judicial bodies in order to see their rights 
protected. 
Before starting our analysis, a short remark should be made on the issue, why it is especially 
important to investigate the position of individuals in cases concerning review the validity of 
EU acts on the ground of rules of international law. Most of the questions related to the 
position of international law in the EU legal order, as in the present case, too, have been 
raised in the framework of preliminary ruling procedure.48 As it is well known, the procedure 
gives authorisation to the Court to decide those questions on interpretation and validity of EU 
law, which arise in proceedings brought before national courts.49 As regards the position of 
international law in the EU legal order, the question thus arise as to whether the private 
individuals can invoke their rights under the rules of international law before the national 
court, in order to challenge/contest the validity of acts of the EU institutions. Consequently, as 
the Court explained in its judgment International Fruit Company, “Before invalidity can be 
relied upon before a national court, that provision of international law must also be capable of 
conferring rights on citizens of the Community which they can invoke before the courts.”50 
 
 
1. International agreements concluded by the EU as grounds for review the legality of 
secondary EU-norms 
 
Although the European Union is an International Organisation itself, the founding Treaties of 
the EU are laconic as to what position and effects have norms of international law in the EU 
legal order. Article 3(5) TEU only provides that: “In its relations with the wider world, the 
Union […] shall contribute to […] the strict observance and the development of international 
law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.” 
 
As regards international agreements to which the EU is a party, Article 216(2) TFEU declares 
that “Agreements concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union and 
on its Member States.” According to the settled case law, agreements covered by this article 
form an integral part of the legal order of the European Union as from its entry into force,51 
and, consequently, they prevail over acts of the European Union.52 Thus, the Court concluded 
in the present case that both the Kyoto Protocol and the Open Skies agreement as instruments 
being approved on behalf of the EU must be binding on its institutions (in the sense of Article 
216(2) TFEU.) 
This provision is silent on the issue of what effects should be given to international norms 
within the EC legal order.53 In its early ruling Kupfenberg, the Court explained that 
 
 “In conformity with the principles of public international law Community institutions [...] 
are free to agree with [a non-member country] what effect the provisions of the agreement 
are to have in the legal order of the contracting parties.”54 
 
However, the practice has shown that the contracting parties rarely determine which effects 
such agreements must have.55 As regards the latter case, the Court also added that “if the 
contracting parties have not agreed which effects an international agreement should have, this 
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question must be determined within the Community according to Community law criteria.”56 
These criteria were finally formulated in the judgment Demirel, as the following: 
 
“A provision in an agreement concluded by the Community with non-member countries 
must be regarded as being directly applicable when, regard being had to its wording and 
the purpose and nature of the agreement itself, the provision contains a clear and precise 
obligation which is not subject, in its implementation or effects, to the adoption of any 
subsequent measure.”57 
 
In its subsequent case law, the Court further clarified the first precondition as the “wording 
and the purpose and nature” of an international treaty is appropriate for creating direct effect 
“only where the nature and the broad logic of the latter do not preclude this”.58 
This (the above) interpretation of the conditions for invocability of international agreements 
has remained substantively unaltered in the present judgment. Thus, the Court established that 
only the Open Skies Agreement is able to meet the requirements of the “direct effect test” (see 
the Demirel formulation above) formed by settled case law. The Kyoto Protocol, although it is 
also binding on the EU, can not be regarded as an agreement being invocable to review the 
validity of a secondary EU act, since it allows the parties a certain degree of flexibility in the 
implementation of their commitments. 
Such as previous cases concerning the effect of agreements concluded by the EU, the present 
judgment also suggests that the direct effect test is identical to the general conditions having 
established in the settled case law for direct effect of internal EU norms.59 As a result, the 
conclusion can be drawn that the Court not simply declares these agreements as “integral part 
of the Union’s legal order”, but practically gives them the same effect as internal EU norms.60 
 
2. International agreements concluded by Member States as grounds for review the legality 
of secondary EU-norms 
 
As far as international agreements concluded by Member States with third states or 
international organisations are concerned, the Court has not adopted the same approach. In the 
present case, the claimants also refer to the Chicago Convention, to which all the Member 
States are parties, but not the EU itself. 
The founding Treaties say nothing on the effect of these agreements. Article 351(1) TFEU 
only declares that „ The rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before 1 
January 1958 or, for acceding States, before the date of their accession, between one or more 
Member States on the one hand, and one or more third countries on the other [so called „prior 
agreements/treaties”], shall not be affected by the provisions of the Treaties.” 
As regards the effect of the prior treaties in the EU legal order, the Court made clear in its 
decision Burgoa that 
 
“...the purpose of that provision is to lay down, in accordance with the principles of 
international law, that the application of the treaty does not affect the duty of the Member 
State concerned to respect the rights of non-member countries under a prior agreement 
and to perform its obligations thereunder. […] However, that duty of the Community 
institutions is directed only to permitting the Member State concerned to perform its 
obligations under the prior agreement and does not bind the Community as regards the 
non-member country in question.”61 
 
The Court acknowledged only the following situation as exceptional case: 
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“it is only if and in so far as, pursuant to the EU and FEU Treaties, the European Union 
has assumed the powers previously exercised by its Member States in the field, […] to 
which [the prior agreement] applies that the convention’s provisions would have the 
effect of binding the European Union.”62 
 
This exception has its foundation on the ruling of the Court in International Fruit Company.63 
That case concerned an apple importer who challenged (before the national court) the validity 
of three Community regulation imposing restrictions on the importation of apples on the 
ground that they infringed provisions of GATT 1947. The Court answered the question 
referred by the Dutch court for preliminary ruling that: 
 
“10. It is clear that at the time when they concluded the treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community the Member States were bound by the obligations of the General 
Agreement. 
 
12. […] their desire to observe the undertakings of the General Agreement follows as 
much from the very provisions of the EEC Treaty […] 
13 That intention was made clear in particular by article 110 of the EEC Treaty,64 which 
seeks the adherence of the Community to the same aims as those sought by the General 
Agreement, as well as by the first paragraph of article 234 (now article 351 TFEU) […] 
 
14 The Community has assumed the functions inherent in the tariff and trade policy, 
progressively during the transitional period and in their entirety on the expiry of that 
period, by virtue of articles 11165 and 11366 of the Treaty (now article 207 TFEU). 
 
15 By conferring those powers on the Community, the Member States showed their wish 
to bind it by the obligations entered into under the general agreement.67 
 
The reasoning of the Court clearly shows the way in which agreements covered by Article 
351 TFEU are able to have binding effect on the EU. The judgment is a manifestation of the 
succession theory of international law, under which it is generally possible that treaty 
commitments are transferred from one entity to another; a typical example of this is the state 
succession when there is a change in legal identity.68 In the legal context of the case, the 
reference on the ex-articles 110, 111 and 113 has built a bridge between obligations of the 
Member States undertaken in the prior agreements on the one hand and the (exclusive) 
competence of the EU (as successor) in the field of Common Commercial Policy on the other. 
However, the Court appears to be reluctant to apply the succession theory as set out in 
International Fruit Company case and rather tends to exclude the possibility of assumption of 
previous Member States’ commitments by the EU.69 This was the case in the present 
judgment, as well, in which the Court argued that the EU does not have “exclusive 
competence in the entire field of international civil aviation as covered by [the Chicago] 
Convention,”70 and, thus, is not bound by that convention. 
 
The Court also adopted a negative stance in relation to those agreements, which are invoked 
to challenge the validity of EU acts having the aim to incorporate the agreement in question 
in EU law. An illustration of this can be found in Intertanko,71 where the claimants in the 
main proceedings submitted that the Directive 2005/3572 did not comply with Marpol 
Convention 73/78,73 to which only Member States are parties but not the EU. The Court 
concluded that 
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“Since the Community [in the absence of a full transfer of the powers previously 
exercised by the Member States to it] is not bound by Marpol 73/78, the mere fact that 
Directive 2005/35 has the objective of incorporating certain rules set out in that 
Convention into Community law is likewise not sufficient for it to be incumbent upon the 
Court to review the directive’s legality in the light of the Convention.74 
 
It can be noted here, in the light of the implied power case law, that the way of interpretation 
of the “assumption of powers” in the present context does not seems to be consistent with the 
Court’s generally broad view of implied exclusive EU powers. The concept of implied power 
has its origin in the early AETR judgment,75 in which the Court ruled that 
 
“… it follows that to the extent to which [internal] Community rules are promulgated for 
the attainment of the objectives of the treaty, the Member States cannot, outside the 
framework of the Community institutions, assume obligations which might affect those 
rules or alter their scope.”76 
 
The use of term “affect” has been instrumental in expanding the external competences of the 
EU in almost all areas of law.77 In order to draw the borderlines of the EU’s exclusive treaty-
making powers, the Court seems to apply the “effect-based” test78 quite extensively, in 
particular in its recent case law, which suggests that hypothetical, possible or future effect of 
Member States’ legislative development/treaty-making practice on EU law is sufficient to 
satisfy the test.79 
As opposed to the traditional broad interpretation of exclusive implied powers in the AETR 
and subsequent decisions, the Court, as we have seen, inter alia, in the present case, does not 
follow a similar approach in relation to “assumed powers” in the light of the International 
Fruit Company ruling. The Court limited the possibility of assumption of the Member States’ 
international commitments only to those cases where the EU assumed all the powers 
previously exercised by the Member States that fall within the convention in question; in 
other words, the EU must have exclusive competence in the entire field covered by that 
convention. Moreover, when investigating the scope of EU’s exclusive competencies, the 
Court does not use the same “effect-based” test as that of the implied power case-law; as basis 
for assumed (implied) exclusive powers it rather focuses only on the fields which were indeed 
pre-empted, but does not take in account fields, in which, exercise of powers individually by 
Member State(s), even if potentially or hypothetically, might affect the functioning of internal 
EU rules. 
From a strict legal perspective, it is difficult to understand why the Court sees more 
restrictively the scope of exclusive external EU powers when interpreting them as assumed 
powers on the basis of Member States’ prior agreements than in any other cases, whereas the 
scope of external powers can be determined, whatever may be the legal context, according to 
the provisions of the founding Treaties and internal EU legislation in force. For a reasonable 
answer, it is worth to investigate closer the legal situations, where the scope of external EU 
powers arises is at stake. The question of assumed powers typically arises when the Court 
considers the validity of an EU act in the light of a prior agreement of Member States (in the 
framework of preliminary rulings procedure and in the case of action for annulment). In such 
cases, the Court thus indirectly determines the binding effect of the contested international 
agreement on the EU, as well. Accordingly, the more extensively interprets the Court the 
scope of assumed powers, the larger sphere leaves it for international law’s influence on the 
legislative activities of the EU institutions. (Of course, the legality of the Member States 
international commitments towards third parties remains out of question.) 
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Defining the scope of external EU powers has an opposite consequence in any other cases, 
where international law does not serve as a benchmark against validity of EU legislation. The 
Court usually has to investigate the question of (explicit or implied) external EU powers in the 
framework of infringement procedure, as well as in procedure provided by Article 218(11) 
TFEU (compatibility with the Treaties of an envisaged agreement to be concluded by the EU). 
Both procedures are inter alia designed, even if indirectly, to give jurisdiction to the Court to 
rule on questions of division competences between EU and Member States,80 and, 
consequently, on the legality of the Member States’ international commitments in the light of 
the founding Treaties. Thus, in the latter case, EU law has a better position than in the 
previous situation, since the Court is still able to influence the scope of individual 
international commitments of the Member States towards third parties. The more extensively 
interprets the Court the exclusive external competencies of the EU and, consequently, the 
more restrictively the ability of (the sphere in which) the Member States can undertake 
international commitments outside the framework of the Union, the less place remains for the 
influence of international law into the EU legal order. 
As we have seen, in both cases, the independency of EU law from international law is at stake 
and the different ways of interpretation serve the same political interest: safeguarding the 
autonomy of the EU legal order from the influence of international law. At this point, we can 
firmly accept Lavranos’ view that the main aim and result of the new line of jurisprudence is 
to protect the autonomy of European law from international law interferences.81 
 
Based on the wording of the International Fruit Company judgment cited above and the 
whole context of the case, two directions of interpretation of the “assumption of powers” 
theory can be identified: 1.) The Court does not require that the powers previously exercised 
by the Member States must be assumed by the EU in its entirety in the subject matter of the 
international agreement in question 2.) The assumption of powers by the EU is possible only 
in the same legal context as that of the International Fruit Company case, namely, when the 
scope of the EU’s exclusive powers spread over the whole field covered by the agreement. (In 
the latter case, as we have seen above, the Court tends to interpret the scope of assumed 
power restrictively.) 
 
The Court has chosen both in the present judgment and in the Intertanko ruling the second 
way of interpretation, although the first one nor should have been excluded; the reasoning of 
the Tribunal (CFI) in the case Kadi82 serves as an illustration for it. The case, due to its special 
legal context, raises interesting questions concerning the effect of international law norms in 
the EU legal order. 
 
The applicants started proceedings under Article 230 EC (now 263 TFEU) arguing, inter alia, 
that the Community sanction regulation,83 under which they were listed as suspected 
terrorists, had been adopted in breach of certain fundamental rights guaranteed under EU 
law.84 The regulation implemented a United Nations Security Council resolution designed to 
freeze the funds of individuals and organizations associated with terrorist networks. 
As the UN Charter itself is (also) an agreement covered by Article 351 TFEU,85 the CFI 
based its reasoning on an analogy with the International Fruit Company judgment: 
 
“201 Since the entry into force of the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community, the transfer of powers which has occurred in the relations between Member 
States and the Community has been put into concrete form in different ways within the 
framework of the performance of their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations 
(see, by analogy, International Fruit, paragraph 16). 
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202 Thus it is, in particular, that Article 228a of the EC Treaty (now Article 301 EC)86 
was added to the Treaty by the Treaty on European Union in order to provide a specific 
basis for the economic sanctions that the Community, which has exclusive competence in 
the sphere of the common commercial policy, may need to impose in respect of third 
countries for political reasons defined by its Member States in connection with the CFSP, 
most commonly pursuant to a resolution of the Security Council requiring the adoption of 
such sanctions. 
 
203 It therefore appears that, in so far as under the EC Treaty the Community has 
assumed powers previously exercised by Member States in the area governed by the 
Charter of the United Nations, the provisions of that Charter have the effect of binding the 
Community (see, by analogy, on the question whether the Community is bound by the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947, International Fruit, paragraph 
18]” 
 
As it is clear from the above cited argumentation, the CFI does not require the assumption of 
powers previously exercised by Member States in its entirety in the field covered by the prior 
agreement. The CFI refers on the exclusivity of EU competence (with reference on an 
analogy with International Fruit Company judgment) only in the particular field to issue 
economic sanctions. 
In addition, in contrast to the conclusion of the Court in Burgoa, that duty of the EU 
institutions is directed only to permitting the Member State to perform its obligations under 
the prior agreement, the CFI states that 
 
„204 Following that reasoning, it must be held, first, that the Community may not infringe 
the obligations imposed on its Member States by the Charter of the United Nations or 
impede their performance and, second, that in the exercise of its powers it is bound, by the 
very Treaty by which it was established, to adopt all the measures necessary to enable its 
Member States to fulfil those obligations. “ 
  
The Court did not follow the reasoning of the CFI and partially annulled the regulation, on 
the basis of the following arguments:87 
 
“ … an international agreement cannot affect the allocation of powers fixed by the 
Treaties or, consequently, the autonomy of the Community legal system, observance of 
which is ensured by the Court by virtue of the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on it by 
Article 220 EC…“88 
 
„Article 307 EC may in no circumstances permit any challenge to the principles that form 
part of the very foundations of the Community legal order, one of which is the protection 
of fundamental rights, including the review by the Community judicature of the 
lawfulness of Community measures as regards their consistency with those fundamental 
rights.“89 
 
As regards the way of argumentation concerning the scope of Article 351(1) TFEU and effect 
of agreements covered by it, the Court apparently followed a different path than the CFI: 
instead of competence approach, that is considering powers previously exercised by Member 
States and than being assumed by the EU, the Court rather focused on the borderline which 
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generally can limit the exercise of EU competences, irrespective of the art and scope of the 
competence in question: the ‘very foundation of the Community legal order’.  90 
Lavranos pointed out, that “This very sweeping and categorical line of reasoning of the ECJ 
regarding Article 307 EC [now 351(1) TFEU] reveals an important new aspect [...], namely, 
the confirmation that the concept of the ‘very foundation of the Community legal order’ is 
also applicable within the context of pre-accession treaties and their potential conflict with 
Community law.” The judgment makes clear that, while derogations from primary EU law on 
the basis of Article 351(1) TFEU and in the light of Centro-Com91 are possible, there is an 
untouchable core of fundamental European constitutional law values and principles from 
which in no circumstances any derogations are allowed – even if a prior agreement as 
important as the UN-Charter so requires. 92 
 
 
As far as the rights of individuals are concerned, the Court made in the International Fruit 
Company decision (as it was already cited above) an indirect link between “invocability” of 
the provisions of Member States’ agreements and their “direct effect”: “Before invalidity can 
be relied upon before a national court, that provision of international law must also be capable 
of conferring rights on citizens of the Community which they can invoke before the courts.” 
In its subsequent case-law, the Court echoed the conditions for direct effect of agreements to 
which the EU is a party as it was determined in the International Fruit Company ruling. This 
approach might suggest, on the face of it, that once a prior agreement satisfies the strict 
“binding effect” test on the basis of assumption of Member States’ powers, then it can be part 
of the EU legal order, under the same conditions as an agreement concluded by the EU itself. 
However, in decisions on agreements concluded by the EU,93 the Court appears to extend 
their legal effect and let us conclude that, in the light of the International Fruit Company 
judgment, Member States’ treaties could be only used as a background against which legality 
of EU acts might be judged, while EU agreements could be interpreted and applied as if they 
were enacted as EU law.94 
Once the Court excludes the possibility of assumption of powers previously exercised by 
Member States under a prior agreement, Article 351(1) TFEU itself neither can give rise to 
rights, which individuals can invoke before national courts. In Burgoa, the Court emphasised 
that the provision does not have the effect of conferring upon individuals who rely upon an 
agreement concluded prior to the entry into force of the treaty or, as the case may be, the 
accession of the member state concerned, rights which the national courts of the member 
states must uphold. Nor does it adversely affect the rights which individuals may derive from 
such an agreement.95 
Nevertheless, the Court seems to be open to use prior agreements as a tool for interpreting 
norms being accepted as part of the EU legal order. In Intertanko, for example, while it did 
not accepted the view to regard Marpol 73/78 as a Convention being binding on the EU, 
established that 
 
“The […] fact [that Marpol 73/78 binds the Member States] is, however, liable to have 
consequences for the interpretation of, first, UNCLOS [which is an agreement concluded 
by the EU] and, second, the provisions of secondary law which fall within the field of 
application of Marpol 73/78. In view of the customary principle of good faith, which forms 
part of general international law, and of Article 10 EC [now Article 3(4) TEU], it is 
incumbent upon the Court to interpret those provisions taking account of Marpol 73/78.“ 
96 
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It follows from the reasoning above, that even if Article 351(1) TFEU does not give rise to 
binding effect for prior agreements toward institutions of the EU, the Court is obliged, under 
the general duty of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 3(4) TEU, to interpret EU law in 
consistency with these agreements. 
 
 
3. Rules of customary international law as grounds for review the legality of secondary EU-
norms 
 
As grounds for review the validity of directive 2008/181, the claimants refer not only to 
provisions of international agreements, but also to a certain principles of international law. 
The Court consequently recognized in its early case-law, too, that general rules of 
international law such as customary international law are binding on the EU.97 However, that 
recognition does not of itself resolve all the questions concerning the legal effects which such 
law may produce in the EU legal order.98 There is further case law in which the Courts have 
attempted to clarify those effects; the present judgment is the last one in this series. 
The Court already established in the early Poulsen case that „the European Community must 
respect international law in the exercise of its powers” and „therefore provisions of EC 
legislation have to be interpreted, and their scope limited, in the light of the relevant rules of 
customary international law at hand.”99 
In the case Racke, the Court acknowledged customary international law as part of the EU 
legal order for the first time. In order to understand the significance of the present judgment in 
the right way, it is worth to set the ruling Racke100 out in detail. 
The Co-operation Agreement of 2 April 1980 concluded between the European Economic 
Community and the MemberStates on the one hand and the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia on the other (in following: "Co-operation Agreement"), introduced a preferential 
tariff for the import of wine originating in Yugoslavia. In 1991, a regulation of the Council 
suspended the co-operation agreement unilaterally.101 The reasons given were the 
fundamental change in circumstances (rebus sic stantibus), i.e. the civil war and the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia. Racke, a German company, imported wine from Yugoslavia, 
argued that vine import shuld benefit from the preferential rate of custom duty provided by 
the cooperation agreeement and contested the validity of the regulation the German 
Bundesfinanzhof. The latter referred question for preliminary ruling to the Court, asking, 
whether the regulation suspending the Co-operation Agreement was valid in the light of the 
rebus sic stantibus rule of customary international law. 
The Court concluded that 
 
„…the rules of customary international law concerning the termination and the 
suspension of treaty relations by reason of a fundamental change of circumstances are 
binding upon the Community institutions and form part of the Community legal order.” 
 
“In those circumstances, an individual relying in legal proceedings on rights which he 
derives directly from an agreement with a non-member country may not be denied the 
possibility of challenging the validity of a regulation which, by suspending the trade 
concessions granted by that agreement, prevents him from relying on it, and of invoking, 
in order to challenge the validity of the suspending regulation, obligations deriving from 
rules of customary international law which govern the termination and suspension of 
treaty relations.”102 
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As Wouters and van Eeckhoutte rightly emphasize that it should not be overstretched the 
judgment’s significance for the question of invocability of customary international law in the 
Community legal order.103 They mention a few manners/points in which the Court restricts its 
ruling. 
 
Firstly, the judgment can be viewed as a restriction of the invocability of a rule of customary 
international law to review the legality of a Community act to the situation in which this 
Community act is, in fact, an implementation of the invoked rule of customary international 
law, since the contested regulation explicitly stated to have been taken on the basis of rebus 
sic stantibus.104 
Secondly, they point out that the Court further restricts its ruling to rules of customary 
international law of a fundamental nature.105 Although the Court does not define what a 
fundamental rule of customary international law is, it makes clear in the judgment that the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda and the rule of rebus sic stantibus belong to this category.106 
Finally, the Court created a very limited legality test applicable to review the legality of 
Community acts on the basis of a rule of international customary law: 
 
„.However, because of the complexity of the rules in question and the imprecision of 
some of the concepts to which they refer, judicial review must necessarily, and in 
particular in the context of a preliminary reference for an assessment of validity, be 
limited to the question whether, by adopting the suspending regulation, the Council made 
manifest errors of assessment concerning the conditions for applying those rules.”107 
 
In the present judgment, the Court essentially re-affirms its earlier interpretation in Racke 
concerning the invocability of customary international law to challenge the validity of acts of 
EU institutions. However, in a few points, the Court’s recent ruling facilitated (reaching) the 
conditions of that invocability. 
Firstly, the judgment does not restrict the invocability of a rule of customary international law 
to challenge the legality of an EU act to the situation in which the EU act is an 
implementation of the rule of customary international law. 
As regards the international legal context, in contrast to the regulation being subject matter of 
Racke, the aim of the directive 2008/101 is not the implementation of a certain principle of the 
customary international law. Instead, the directive refers on the global aim to promote 
reductions of greenhouse gas emissions (in a cost-effective and economically efficient 
manner), as it is laid down in international agreements concluded by a large number of the 
actors of international law. However, the appropriate provisions of these international 
agreements can not be regarded as codification of a principle of customary international 
law.108 Thus, in the present case, the invocability of a rule of the Customary international law, 
seems to be independent from the fact that whether the aim of the EU legislator was the 
implementation of that rule or not.109 
Secondly, in the present judgment, the Court does not restrict its ruling to a certain (higher) 
category of customary international law. The Court acknowledges the invoked principles as 
being able to serve as ground for invocability, without qualifying them as „rules of customary 
international law of a fundamental nature”. 
However, the reason why we can say that the Court essentially re-affirms its decision in 
Racke is that it upholds the distinction between the possible grounds for reviewing the legality 
of EU acts in the international law, saying, that “a principle of customary international law 
does not have the same degree of precision as a provision of an international agreement”. 
Therefore “judicial review must necessarily be limited to the question whether, in adopting 
the act in question, the institutions of the European Union made manifest errors of assessment 
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concerning the conditions for applying those principles”.110 With that reasoning, the Court not 
only repeats the same “marginal appreciation test”111 as in Racke, but it expresses its view to 
make distinction between the invocability of provisions of international agreements on the 
one hand and that of the rules of customary international law on the other in a more obvious 
way. 
The meaning of “manifest error of assessment” became somewhat clearer in the present 
judgment. The Court has to investigate, in essence, whether the extent to which Directive 
2008/101 shall apply is compatible with the rules of customary international law relied upon 
by the claimants. As we have seen, the Court interpreted the legality of the extent of the 
directive’s application not only in the light of these rules, but it also found support to its 
argumentation in the primary EU law [Article 191(2) TFEU] and in provisions of an 
international agreement concluded by the EU (Kyoto Protocol). The reasoning of the Court 
suggests that the legality test (where rules of customary international law serve as grounds for 
review) means that if the customary law rule in question may be interpreted flexible, the 
Court has to choose the way of interpretation which is the most compatible with the main 
objectives of EU law (that is in the present case the aim of environmental protection).112 
Consequently, the institution which adopted the contested EU act in conformity with such an 
interpretation method, did not made a manifest error of assessment concerning the conditions 
for applying the principles of customary international law. The argumentation presented by 
the Court firmly confirms the view that the main intention of the Court is to protect the 
autonomy of European law from international law interferences by excluding as much as 
possible any conflicts between European law and international law.113 
The “marginal appreciation test” might be contested from several points of view. According 
to the critical remark of Wouters and van Eeckhoutte (to the same reasoning of the Court in 
Racke), it is a misconception and oversimplification to hold that rules of customary 
international law are vague, uncertain and imprecise. They also point out, that the customary 
rule of rebus sic stantibus, as it has been codified in Article 62 of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention and in Article 62 of the 1986 Vienna Convention, has similar characteristics to a 
treaty provision. „It is therefore unacceptable to hold that in reviewing the legality of a 
Community act on the basis of a rule of customary international law only a marginal 
appreciation test should apply, whereas this is not the case in reviewing the legality on the 
basis of a treaty provision.”114 The opinion of AG Kokott in the present case also reaffirms 
this view, arguing that “criteria for determination of the invocability of international 
customary law should not differ from those applicable on an examination of whether and to 
what extent the validity of EU acts can be gauged against international agreements.”115 
 
At this point, it is worth to take a closer look at the judgment of the Tribunal (CFI) in Opel 
Austria.116 Opel Austria GmbH has exported gearboxes to the EU and received Austrian state 
aid for their production. The European Community found the state aid as a violation of the 
Free Trade Agreement between the EC and Austria, and, as a reaction to the aid, the Council 
adopted on 20 December 1993 Regulation (EC) No 3697/93, which introduced an import duty 
for the car gearboxes produced by Opel Austria.117 On 13 December 1993, the EC had 
approved the Agreement on the European Economic Area between the European Community 
and their Member States on the one hand and Austria on the other (“EEA Agreement”). The 
EEA Agreement entered into force on 1 January 1994. 
Opel Austria introduced an application for annulment against the Regulation, arguing, that it 
is incompatible with Article 10 of the EEA Agreement. Although the incompatibility was 
fairly obvious in the case, 118 the CFI could not directly apply the EEA Agreement, since it 
had not entered into force on 20 December 1993.119 However, Opel Austria also argued that 
by adopting the regulation a few weeks before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement, the 
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Council had infringed the rule of customary international law, according to which a signatory 
may not defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force. 
The CFI made a „sudden leap”:120 
 
„“the principle of good faith is the corollary in public international law of the principle of 
protection of legitimate expectations which, according to the case law, forms part of the 
Community legal order.”121 Therefore, „traders may rely on the principle of protection of 
legitimate expectations in order to challenge the adoption by the institutions, during the 
period preceding the entry into force of [the EEA] agreement, of any measure contrary to 
the provisions of that agreement which will have direct effect on them after it has entered 
into force.”122 
 
Accordingly, the CFI annulled the contested regulation after it established that it is 
incompatible with Article 10 of the EEA.123 
The first reading of the judgment suggests that „by means of “transformation approach”, the 
CFI made a rule of customary international law a rule of Community law. Hereby, the 
complex question of invocability of rules of customary international law is avoided.”124 
Similar to the situation in Racke, Article 10 of the EEA agreement (the agreement concluded 
between the Community and a third state) would also be able to have direct effect, if it had yet 
entered into force at the time when the contested measure of the Council has been adopted. 
Secondly (as a second and far-reaching conclusion) , the decision confirms the approach that, 
from the point of view of invocability as ground for review the validity of EU acts, rules of 
customary international law can have the similar characteristics to a treaty provision. Namely, 
the reasoning applied by the CFI let us conclude that the relation of rules of customary 
international law and provisions of international agreements might be interpreted, by analogy, 
as that of the general principles of EU law and articles of the EU Treaties. It is well-
established in the settled case law of the ECJ, that general principles belong to the primary 
sources of EU law having the same rank as the provisions of the EU Treaties thus possessing 
all the characteristics of them:125 That means, they are able to have direct effect and can serve 
as a ground for review the legality of the EU acts under the same conditions as the Treaty 
provisions. Likeweise, it should not be excluded that the rule of customary international law 
(by way of interpretation), is able to have the similar effect as provisions of an international 
agreement under certain circumstances. Therefore, there is no acceptable reason to hold the 
view – which was represented by the Court both in the ruling Racke and in the present 
judgment – that the principle of customary international law never has the same degree of 
precision as a provision of an international agreement and thus the nature of (all type of the) 
rules of customary law itself limits the scope of review to the “manifest errors of assessment”. 
The conclusion can be drawn that there it is no reason to make distinctions between 
provisions of international agreements concluded by the EU on the one hand and rules of 
customary international law on the other, as basis for challenging the validity of an EU act, on 
the ground that they “do not have the same degree of precision as a provision of an 
international agreement” The Opel Austria case shows that general principles of the EU law 
might be regarded as a manifestation of a rule of customary international law, which, as the 
Court established in the settled case-law, can be sufficiently clear and precise to have direct 
effect in the EU legal order, although they are often general formulated and its precise content 
can be determined by the way of interpretation. Viewed from this angle, the nature of rules of 
customary international law is similar.  
 
The effect of rules of customary international law might be influenced rather by another issue, 
that is, the purpose of these rules. The Opinion of Jacobs AG in Racke also supports this 
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view.126 He argued that there were good reasons for not allowing individuals to challenge 
Community acts on the basis of customary international rules relating to treaties, since the 
overall nature and purpose of the law of treaties was to lay down rules applying in the 
relations between States and IOs and it was not intended to create rights for individuals. Non 
the less, Jacobs AG holds the view that such challenges could not wholly excluded; as a 
reason for it, he referred to the Opel Austria and the Racke cases, “where an agreement had 
direct effect and created rights for individuals, the beneficiaries of such rights could have 
legitimate expectation as to the correct and proper interpretation of the agreement, a was 
recognized in Opel Austria. To some extent those expectation could extent to the life itself of 
the agreement, [...] as in Racke, it could be legitimate for an individual to expect that the 
agreement would not suddenly be suspended without due cause.” In conclusion, the AG was 
of the opinion that the Court should review only manifest violation of the law of treaties to the 
detriment of the individual concerned. There had to be a relatively wide margin of discretion 
for the Community institutions to take decision concerning the life of an agreement, in 
accordance with their powers under the Treaty, as it was only logical that this life should be 
primarily in the hands of the contracting parties, and there was an important political 
dimension to the conclusion and termination of agreements which did not lend itself readily to 
judicial review. 
However, AG Jacobs also acknowledged that there could be other types of customary 
international law which did intend to confer rights on individual and their effects should be 
distinguished from those of the law of treaties; he mentioned as an exception rules of 
international humanitarian law. 
The reasoning of AG Jacobs made it clear that the purpose and nature of the rule of customary 
international law in question can determine the effect of these rules on different way. 
However, this is also the case by international agreements. As regards the latter, several types 
of agreements can be distinguished on the basis of intention of the contracting parties to 
confer rights on individual. The conclusion can be drawn that there is no reason to examine 
the “nature and purpose” of rules of customary law another way then provisions of 
international agreements. (nature and purpose: political assessment) 
 
As regard rules of customary international law other than law of treaties, it is important to 
investigate closer the nature and purpose of fundamental rights. Several of these rights 
enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights can also be qualified as rules of 
regional, i.e. European, customary international law.127 
 
At this point, it is worth to recall the jurisdiction of the ECJ concerning fundamental rights, as 
well. Wouters and van Eeckhoutte point out, that the course of reasoning adopted by the CFI 
in Opel Austria is inspired by the Court of Justice’s case-law accepting fundamental rights as 
„an integral part of the general principles of Community law protected by the Court of 
Justice”.128 As it is well-known, because of the fundamental economic character of the 
integration (Community), human rights have not originally been declared by the EC Treaty as 
belonging to the EU legal order. In the earliest phase of the integration, only the Court was 
who made reference on them, saying that, for the purpose to identify the content of 
fundamental rights, „the Court draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to 
the Member States and from the guidelines supplied by international instruments for the 
protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or to which they 
are signatories. In that regard, the ECHR has special significance.”129 To date, the Treaty of 
EU recognizes that “Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of 
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the Union’s law.”130 Moreover, it attributes to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union the same legal value as to the founding Treaties.131 
From a formalistic point of view, as a result of this integration process, rules arising from 
“outsider” legal orders (i. e. national law of the Member States and international law) have 
been (became) not only an integral part of the EU legal order but also belong to the ‘very 
foundation of the Community (EU) legal order’, as it was emphasized in the judgment Kadi. 
Is it a realistic vision that the same thing will happen with those principles of customary 
international law which do not belong to the (sub)category of fundamental rights? 
The case law of the ECJ (the judgment Kadi, in particular) also made clear that the review of 
legality of EU acts on the basis of human rights is not limited to the “manifest errors of 
assessment”, although the formulation of these rights not always have the same degree of 
precision as the provisions of the EU Treaties. 
 
Taking into account all of these considerations, the question arises, why the case-law 
consequently excludes that rules of customary international law can have the same effect in 
the EU legal order than other norms of EU law (either provisions of the EU Treaties or those 
of international agreements concluded by the EU with third states). The recent judgments of 
the Court (the present judgment, as well) support the presumption that the reason behind can 
be the protection of the EU (autonomous) legal order from international law. 
Non of these judgments can be seen as an alteration from the traditional 
Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit of the EU, but rather as an expression of the intention of (formed 
case by case in the jurisprudence) the Court (of the principle) that EU law must be protected 
from the influence of any other “strange” legal system, as much as possible. As Klabbers 
established, even the decision Kadi is not seen as an exception to the 
Völkerrechtfreundlichkeit, much less as a merely internal constitutional case but rather as the 
formulation of the Court’s position on the relationship between international law and EU law: 
namely that the Court is interested first and foremost in the defence of the autonomy of the 
EU legal order,132by excluding as much as possible any conflicts between European and 
international law. 
Viewed from this angle, it can be easier understood, why the Court upholds in the present 
judgment the distinction, as grounds for review the legality of EU acts, between provisions of 
international agreements to which the EU is a party on the one hand and rules of customary 
international law on the other. The Court sees international agreements concluded by the EU 
rather as part of the EU law and less as part of the international law, and, in doing so, it does 
not suffer the (possible) establishment of invalidity of an EU secondary norm as an “injury” to 
the autonomy of the EU legal order. 
This attitude of the Court can be seen as which entails that the legality of the EU measures 
can only be judged against its own legal framework; that is, against norms that have 
(somehow) been incorporated in the EU legal order.133 Thus, although the Court 
declared/acknowledged in its settled case law customary international law also as integral part 
of the EU legal order, it seems so that it still regards these rules rather as a strange body 
(“outsider”), and therefore accepts them as possible grounds for invalidity of an EU act only 
in exceptional cases. 
However, as regards the “outsider” rules of international law, the case law shows that 
customary law (still) have a higher position in the EU legal order then agreements to which 
Member States are parties but not the EU. In the case Intertanko, the Court, after it 
established that the EU has not assumed the commitments of the Member States undertaken 
by the Marpol Convention 73/78, concluded that 
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„as is clear from settled case-law, the powers of the Community must be exercised in 
observance of international law, including provisions of international agreements in so 
far as they codify customary rules of general international law. None the less, it does not 
appear that […] Marpol 73/78 [is] the expression of customary rules of general 
international law.“134 
 
With this statement, the Court made an obvious distinction: the rules of customary 
international law rather have a similar function to the general principle of EU law in the EU 
legal order, since the EU institutions have a general obligation to respect them when acting in 
their legislative capacity. Consequently, this duty is independent from the subject matter of 
the legislation, while international agreements of the Member States are binding on the EU 
only in so far as the EU has assumed the international commitments undertaken by the 
Member States. Thus, the binding effect of the agreements is the question of scope, since the 
EU has the capacity to assume the international commitments of the Member States only in 
the field where it has exclusive external competence, which can be derived (explicitly or 
implicitly) from the provisions of the EU Treaties. 
 
4. The question of “invocability” and “direct effect” of international legal norms in the EU 
legal order 
 
 
Distinguishing the terms “invocability” and “direct effect” has became the most difficult 
question in the context of application customary international law. As we have seen above, 
both concepts were applied in connection with the review of validity of an EU act on the basis 
of international legal norms, in particular with the rights of individuals to invoke rules of 
customary international law to challenge legality of secondary EU norms before judicial 
bodies. The Racke case has served an excellent illustration for the problem of determination 
the scope of individual rights in such a context. Therefore, it is worth to recall the judgment in 
the case again and compare it with the present ruling. The language used by the Court is quite 
similar, however, the decisions have different consequences on individual rights. 
 
In Racke, the Court firmly separated the question of application of customary international 
law from the issue of direct effect. The judgment is restricted to the situation in which an 
individual invokes a rule of customary international law to review the legality of a 
Community act, at the same time it does not concern the question of direct effect.135 The 
Court expressly said, that „In this case, however, the plaintiff is incidentally challenging the 
validity of a Community regulation under those rules [of customary international law] in 
order to rely upon rights which it derives directly from an agreement of the Community with a 
non-member country. This case does not therefore concern the direct effect of those rules.”136 
It follows from this paragraph that the Court viewed the case rather as one in which a private 
individual relies on the direct effect of the Co-operation Agreement and, in doing so, 
challenges the validity of a Community regulation preventing him from relying on the rights 
granted to him.137 Thus, the Court in Racke (especially in paragraph 47 and 51) makes clear 
that the individual may invoke obligations that for the EC flow from customary international 
law.138 However, not the rule of customary international law itself is able to grant to him 
directly invocable rights. In this sense, the decision Racke did not step over the significance of 
the Kupfenberg ruling and following case law, which mention only „[the] provision of [an 
international agreement concluded by the Community is]” as “capable of conferring rights 
on citizens [.] which they can invoke before the courts”.139 
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On the contrary, Eeckhout found an analogy between legal effect of agreements concluded by 
the Member States on the one hand and that of rules of customary international law on the 
other. He holds the view that when one compares the facts and claims in Racke with those in 
International Fruit Company, it is difficult to find any material differences. The position of 
international law in International Fruit Company was not dissimilar: if the regulation 
restricting imports of apples had been declared invalid, International Fruit Company (the 
individual) would have benefited from the right to free importation under the then applicable 
Community rules and not directly under the provisions of GATT. Despite of that, the Court 
defined as requirement for invocability that the provision of international law (itself) confers 
rights on citizens. On the basis of that reasoning, Eeckhout concludes that “the Racke case 
was concerned with the direct effect of rules of customary international law, contrary to the 
Court’s own assessment”.140 
Eeckhout view suggests that “direct effect” might be regarded as a collective concept which 
relates not only to international norm being able both to confer rights on individuals and to be 
invocable before national court (at the same time) but also to norm owning solely the last 
character. However, this approach has not been shared unanimously in the legal literature. 
Holdgaard’s definition, for instance, does not make a direct link between “invocability” and 
individual rights: “a provision of international law is directly invocable if it can be relied on 
within the Community legal order per se, i. e. without the assistance of a domestic legal 
norm.”141 since “In a particular case, [...] the practical effect of a hierarchically superior rule 
of international law depends on whether it can be directly invoked”.142 In accordance with this 
approach, most of the commentators hold the view that direct effect concerns the justiciability 
of an international norm, that is whether the provision at issue is sufficiently clear and 
unconditional (and does not require further implementing acts) to be capable conferring rights 
on individuals. 143 
Facing different views in the legal literature on use of terminology is not surprising. As we 
have seen above, the Court itself also applies the concepts “invocability”, and “direct effect” 
in a confusing way. The above cited paragraph of the ruling International Fruit Company 
shows that the Court applies the word „invoke” to the rights of individuals arising from an 
international agreement concluded by the EU which can be protected before national courts 
and serve, at the same time, as a ground for challenge the validity of an EU act. The legal 
literature typically uses the term “direct effect” to refer provisions of international agreements 
being capable to confer directly invocable rights on individuals in the sense of International 
Fruit Company decision.144 
In contrast, as regards the effect of rules of customary international law in EU legal order, the 
ruling Racke apparently shows, that not necesserily the international norm containing rights of 
individual will be invocable in order to grant protection to these rights.145 This is the element 
of the reasoning which let us conclude that the Court did not require “direct effect” for the 
invocability of a norm of customary international law to review the legality of a Community 
act.146  
Having regard to the factual background to the International Fruit Company case, the ruling 
gives rise to confusion when interpreting „invocability” in the judment Racke. Eeckhout 
rightly points out that if the contested regulation in International Fruit Company had been 
declared invalid, the individual would have benefited from the right to free importation under 
the then applicable Community rules and not directly under the provisions of GATT. 
However, the case-law subsequently has confirmed the view that, in the meaning of 
International Fruit Company judgment, “direct effect” and „invocability” of provisions of an 
international agreement can not be separated from each other. Thus, the case-law on direct 
effect of international agreements do not support the interpretation that the similarity of facts 
and reasoning in Racke on the one hand and in International Fruit Company on the other let 
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us to conclude that the Court implicitly gave direct effect to rules of customary international 
law. The analogy of the approach adpoted in Racke with those adpoted in relation to the 
effects of directives147 can support the latter conclusion: in its judgment Unilever, the Court 
established that the inconsistency of the adoption of national measure with the procedure laid 
down in a directive on technikal standars was allowed to be invoked in proceedings between 
individuals whilst the Court expressly excluded the direct effect of the directive.148 
 
The legal literature interpreting case law on effects of international law seems to be 
consequent only in so far as it makes a clear distinction between „justicibiality” of an 
international legal norm on the one hand and the ability of that norm to be ground for review 
the legality of EU act on the other. On the basis of argumentations presented above, to types 
of individual rights in the context of challenging the validity of EU acts on the basis of norms 
of international law can be distinguished: 
1.) the substantial right of the individual which can directly be derived from the norm of 
international law and which needs to be protected. The international legal norm which serves 
as the source of these rights has direct effect if protection of the rights can be granted to the 
individual before the judicial forum in question. 
2.) the procedural right of the individual to challenge the validity of the EU act which 
infringed/violated the substantial right described in the point 1.). The norm of international 
law is invocable, when the individual can invoke it in order to protect its substantial right 
according to point 1.). 
There are many situations when both the substantial and the procedural right derive from the 
same norm of international law: this is the case by international agreements which confer 
rights of individuals. However, in certain cases, the sources of the substantial and procedural 
rights are different, as we have seen in Racke examined above. 
 
 
Returning to our present case, the conclusion can be drawn that the ruling has brought some 
changes concerning the invocability of rules of customary international law to review the 
validity of an EU act, from the point of view of individuals, as well. 
Firstly, in the present case, the legal context in which customary international law have been 
invoked was different from that in Racke, as the claimant’s reference to the rules of customary 
international law has not been attached to rights which could be derived from international 
agreements. In other words, the reference on customary international law to challenge the 
validity of the contested directive was independent from the reference on provisions of 
international treaties. Unlike the cases Racke and Opel Austria, the rules relied upon by the 
claimants do not belong to the subgroup of the law of treaties within customary international 
law but they can be regarded as embodying the current state of customary international 
maritime and air law, as it was emphasized by the Court itself.149 The overall nature and 
purpose of this kind of law, in contrast to the law of treaties, do not exclude automatically that 
its rules (the principle of freedom to fly over the high seas, for instance) might be sufficiently 
clear and precise to confer rights on individuals. 
Under these circumstances, the Court had no reason to separate, as did it in Racke, the source 
of rights granted to the private individual on the one hand and the source of obligations for the 
EC on the other. Thus, an opportunity was given to the Court to change its viewpoint to direct 
effect of the rules of customary international law. 
As a result, the Court, for the first time, did not excluded the possibility that rules of 
customary international law might give rise to invocable rights for individuals, even if it did 
not acknowledged the direct effect of these rules expressly: 
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“even though the principles at issue appear only to have the effect of creating obligations 
between States, it is nevertheless possible, in circumstances such as those of the case 
which has been brought before the referring court, in which Directive 2008/101 is liable to 
create obligations under European Union law as regards the claimants in the main 
proceedings, that the latter may rely on those principles and that the Court may thus 
examine the validity of Directive 2008/101 in the light of such principles.”150 
 
The Court’s careful approach is in consistency with the practice of domestic courts in Europa. 
In most domestic legal systems, courts are under certain conditions willing to accept that a 
private individual invokes a rule of customary international law to interpret a domestic rule in 
conformity with customary international law; to derive a right out of a rule of customary 
international law; or – the strongest and most far-reaching use – to contest the legality of a 
rule of domestic law.151 However, this last type of reliance on customary international law is 
especially severely restricted in the case-law of many States.152 As regards the first case, the 
Court seems to be also open to use rules of customary international law as a tool for 
interpreting EU law.153 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This case analysis shows that the present judgment can not be regarded as a dramatic turn in 
the case-law concerning the relationship between EU law and international law. The decision 
is rather fits in the series of recent rulings and tends to confirm the Court’s conception that the 
autonomy of the EU legal order must be protected from international law. At the same time, 
the judgment made also clear that the autonomy of the EU legal order is not unlimited, since 
the EU institutions must act within the limits which were raised by the norms of international 
law. 
As regards the position of international agreements in the EU legal order, the argumentation 
of the Court in the present judgment does not diverge from the line of reasoning followed in 
previous case-law. Accordingly, the Court is reluctant to accept the binding effect of 
agreements to which (only) the Member States are parties and tends to acknowledge only the 
agreements concluded by the EU as integral part of the Union’s legal order. However, the 
judgment made somewhat easier the way in which the legality of the EU acts on the ground of 
rules of customary international law can be reviewed and, in contrast to previous case law, did 
not exclude the possibility that individuals can derive invocable rights directly from these 
rules.  
 
It was argued above that, viewed from a formalistic legal point of view, a similar process of 
integration into the EU legal order as it is seen in the case of human rights can not be 
excluded. This assumption might be reinforced by reference on the conception (presented 
above) which regards fundamental rights as special group within rules of customary 
international law, i.e. European (regional) customary international law. Art 3(5) TEU, 
expressly providing that the EU shall contribute to the observance and the development of 
international law, might also serve as a basis for such an integration process. 
However, the new line of jurisprudence concerning the relationship between EU law and 
international law does not support the above assumption. The present judgement also 
confirms the view that the Court seeks to protect the autonomy of EU legal order by all 
possible means of reasoning and this intention determines the outcome of its decisions. The 
Court seems to be especially careful when investigating the effect of those international legal 
norms which have not been incorporated in the EU legal order. 
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On the one hand, it can be the reason for the Court’s refusing attitude toward binding effect of 
international agreements concluded by Member States. Accordingly, the Court’s restrictive 
interpretation on scope of assumed power previously exercised by Member States under prior 
agreements (covered by Article 351(1) TFEU) fails to be consistent with its argumentation 
concerning exclusive external powers of the EU according to the AETR “effect-based” test. 
On the other hand, the Court’s (presumed) intention to safeguard the autonomy of EU law 
also appears in its attitude to customary international law. Even if the latter enjoys a better 
position in the EU legal order than agreements to which the Member States are parties, the 
Court is still far away from giving to them the same rank in the EU law as to the agreements 
concluded by the EU (although it went one step ahead with facilitating the conditions for 
invocability of rules of customary international law). The result of the present judgment 
suggests that the Court does not regards the “justiciability” of these norms equal to that of 
provisions of international agreements concluded by the EU, albeit if formally acknowledges 
them as “integral part of the Union’s legal order”. Thus, taking together the result of the 
present judgment and the tendency in the case-law, we rightly can have the feeling that rules 
of customary international law have a valid ticket to enter, but still remain outside the 
exclusive club of the EU legal order. 
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